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II. Summary 
 
The paper studies the implicit debt burden of the Hungarian social security system, and 
especially its changes after certain real and hypothetical reform measures. It uses a com-
puter simulation of a demographic model. The most important results are the following. 
The Hungarian implicit debt burden, prior to the 1998 reform, was quite substantial but 
not extraordinarily high in an international comparison. As the result of the imple-
mented reforms, it has decreased from 100% of 1995 GDP to roughly 40% of it. This is 
equivalent to a permanent budget cut of approximately 1.5% of GDP per year. If we 
smooth the cyclicality of the late 90s less, then these measures are even better. 
Considering further reform scenarios, the only promising direction (let alone the unreal-
istic 5% improvement in revenue collection) was the decrease of the size of the first 
(PAYG) pillar of pensions. Cutting contribution rates (which is a current policy pro-
posal) seems absolutely infeasible from a long-run perspective. 
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III. I. Introduction1 
 
Public debt has been a central and controversial issue for a broad spectrum of economic 
actors: academic researchers, investors, government agencies and political decision-
makers. The debates are endless on the role of public debt and its effects on the econ-
omy. Investors closely follow the indebtedness of a country when evaluating the coun-
try's sovereign risk; and consequently, policymakers also pay heavy attention to deficits, 
measures of debt and constraints on these2. 
 
In addition to the aforementioned explicit public debt (which is in the form of loans and 
other financial instruments), all governments face additional pre-committed services. 
All these represent an income-expenditure flow, which can add up to a substantial (posi-
tive or negative) discounted value: this is the implicit debt burden of a government. Our 
goal is to give acceptable estimates of one major component of this number: social se-
curity deficits (or sometimes, surpluses). 
 
The importance of the question is immediate: neglecting the implicit debt can lead both 
to serious inconsistencies of the budget, and to heavy under/overestimation of a coun-
try's financial situation, risk. So our results should be interesting both for investors and 
policymakers. This already indicates two main criteria any such estimate should meet: 
precision and (international) comparability. The ideal would be – as always – to satisfy 
both. If this is not feasible (as usually), then one can try to keep one criterion above 
some limit and improve as much as possible on the other side. 
 
Our approach will be of this type as well: keeping most assumptions comparable to 
other (international) studies, and, in the same time, using specific details of the demo-
graphic, economic and legal (e.g. tax brackets and policy) situation of Hungary. We still 
cannot, however, expect numbers readily applicable for precise financial planning – 
only for international comparison, guidance in orders of magnitude and in directions of 
some effects. But this is not without practical use: the signs and magnitudes can help 
orienting the policymakers within their feasible region, where they can do the final fine 
tuning on a more trial-and-error basis. 
 
Calculating the present discounted value of the income-expenditure flows is a useful 
measure of these burdens because it gives one single number. We can interpret this as 
the price the government would get or have to pay, were it to sell its social security sys-
tem to a risk-neutral and infinitely lived entrepreneur (who would volunteer to run the 
system, based on the same legal constraints as the government), neglecting the costs of 
operation. Financing this transaction from debt (most social security systems represent a 
net liability, not a claim) would increase the public debt exactly by the value of the im-
plicit debt. Independent Social Security Funds can also be interpreted as selling the sys-
                                                          
1 I would like to thank valuable comments and discussions by Mária Augusztinovics, István Hamecz, 
Gábor P. Kiss, István P. Székely, and seminar participants at NBH. 
2 Elmendorf-Mankiw [98] provides an excellent survey of these issues. 
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tem: in that case, the implicit debt measures the amount the Fund has to get at start if it 
is supposed to be self-financing from then on. 
 
The implicit debt becomes explicit through time just by its nature – hence it is natural to 
consider it together with the explicit debt when assessing the long-run outlook of a 
country's financial position. Although it is easier to reduce the expenditure of the im-
plicit debt than to default on government bonds: for example, with a pension or health-
care reform; but changing the value of present and past contributions is also close to 
defaulting. 
 
Of course, short-run dynamics of the implicit debt can substantially differ from the in-
terest service of a sum equal to this debt – in this case, governments will always be less 
conservative on this side of budgetary planning than on the explicit government debt 
part. But someone will have to pay the cost of these good days: future governments 
must deal with the accelerated imbalances of the system. 
 
Thus the implicit debt can be a strategic element in the game played by consecutive 
governments: one government can choose its measures such that the next one will in-
herit a situation where the implicit debt becomes explicit faster, and so this government 
will be more constrained in its decisions. Increasing the implicit debt can improve popu-
larity of the regime while maintaining a seemingly good financial situation (this is the 
same misrepresentation of a country's indebtedness as what we mentioned earlier). 
 
If there are international treaties limiting debt-GDP and other such ratios, it is in our 
view necessary to have such measures of the implicit debt as well. One could say that it 
would become explicit and thus part of the regulation anyway: but by that time the im-
balance can be so serious that it is far more costly to stabilize. This is further empha-
sized by the nature of the implicit debt: it usually depends heavily on demographic fac-
tors, which change very slowly but steadily, and it is hard and costly to intervene into 
such processes, and as slow as their speed of change (if possible at all). 
 
Besides its appealing features, the present value as a measure of the implicit debt bur-
den has its disadvantages as well. Its largest blessing, namely that it is a single number, 
is also a curse: the result is extremely sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. This 
problem is present at the income-expenditure approach as well (when including the in-
terest service of deficits, one has to choose a real interest rate, which is the same story), 
but to a lot smaller degree. And if one disregards the interest payments and considers 
the primary balance only, this ceases to be an issue. 
 
This is not the only item on the list: the results are subject to mistakes from any fore-
casts used, economic, demographic, legal, political assumptions. This holds for basi-
cally any other measure as well (some of them may be eliminated, for example, if we 
use expenditure-GDP ratios, then the growth rate of the economy will matter less – but 
will still matter, because pensions reflect not only present, but also past wages). More-
over, calculating the discounted value can help decreasing these effects since it picks a 
particular measure of the standard present-future tradeoff (which measure is again ad 
hoc, one should not forget it). 
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The interpretation of the implicit debt is also somewhat hazy: whether we can or we 
should deal with it in the same way as we do with the explicit debt. On the one hand, we 
have already discussed that the time profile of its imbalances is quite different from that 
of the explicit burden. On the other hand, most of the constraints on the explicit debt are 
not valid, or at least not in their full strength, for the implicit debt. And as such, it has a 
maybe more similar nature to other future budgetary policy variables/expectations, and 
can be analyzed from the viewpoint of feasible long-run fiscal policies. 
 
Besides this, the implicit debt is purely a financial indicator, and remains silent about 
any welfare effects of the transfers summarized in it (like aggregate measures usually). 
Moreover, in many cases, all the cut in the debt burden is matched one in one by the 
decreased value of pensions (the only situation where it is not true is when there are 
other sources of pensions and not only the pay-as-you-go). We will touch on some of 
these issues from time to time, but the main emphasis will remain strictly on the pure 
fiscal calculations. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. The section following this introduction briefly sum-
marizes the literature. Section three sketches the mechanics and assumptions of our 
model, and discusses their merits and shortcomings. The next section sets out the possi-
ble questions we wish to address and gives the results of the simulations and discusses 
them. The last chapter concludes and points to some further research topics. 
 
IV. An overview of the literature 
 
There are many articles in the literature which analyze similar questions. Usually they 
either discuss the topic of implicit debt and feasible fiscal policies in a wider perspec-
tive3 (hence, also less detailed), or aim at short-run forecasts, analyses about deficits4. A 
further important distinction is that this paper attempts to evaluate a specific reform 
package (and its potential extensions), and not only the pre- or post-reform systems just 
in themselves. 
 
Kane-Palacios [96] analyzes the flow cost rate (current expenditure and income ratio) 
and compares the ratio of the present value of wages and pensions with current contri-
bution rates. The paper emphasizes the need for a standardized methodology of estimat-
ing implicit debt measures, for international comparability. It also reports some esti-
mates for a few countries, including Hungary: its result is 213% of GDP (with a dis-
count rate of 4%). We will compare this number to our results. The paper gives a further 
example: Feldstein-Seligman [81] shows that there is a negative correlation between the 
market value of a firm (measured by its stock market performance) and its implicit pen-
sion liability. The same should apply to a country's risk evaluation. 
 
                                                          
3 Effects of aging (through tax bills and government expenditures, mostly healthcare, as well), e. g. 
Chand [96], Leibfritz et al [95]; studies of more than one countries but using less specifics of those, e. g. 
Kuné [93]. We will discuss one representative example of each in more details. 
4 See for example, Augusztinovics [95]. 
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The 1995 IMF survey (World Economic Outlook) centers around the effects of aging on 
government budgets. Hence, there are two chief actors in the game: social security and 
healthcare. The paper defines the notion of sustainable contribution rates, and analyzes 
its changes as a result of reforms of different form and timing. For social security calcu-
lations, the results are between 5 and 115% (of GDP), but they do not take into account 
the balances after 2050. We will see that it heavily understates the total debt burden, 
since the current negative demographic trends keep worsening these imbalances. 
 
Herd-van der Noord [94] analyses similar questions and also applies similar methods to 
our paper, but (like we mentioned earlier on) the authors consider more countries and 
courser details. Their basic assumptions are the following. They use country-specific 
and somewhat detailed information on social security systems and demography5. The 
population is chosen to be roughly constant. Real wage growth per year is 2%, activity 
rates are kept at the 1990 level. Finally, the real discount rate is initially 4%, then it 
gradually decreases to 3% (from 2010 to 2050). As results, they obtain total implicit 
debt numbers between -167 and -50 (with flat rate benefits), or 43 and 382 (with earn-
ings-related benefits) percentage of GDP, depending on countries, choices of indexation 
and ways of calculating benefits. With higher discounting, these latter numbers decrease 
to values between -8 and 144%, while if the indexation of benefits become linked to 
wages and not to prices, then increase to 69 – 382%. The authors also analyze four re-
form scenarios (i.e., alternative ways of financing) : PAYG with increased contribu-
tions, fully funded system (with the need for extra financing of the transition), benefits 
less related to earnings, and finally, an increase of the retirement age. The approach is, 
however, rather from a generational account perspective: thus, for example, the simula-
tions deviate from the current contribution rates, and assume instead a rate necessary for 
a balanced annual budget. 
 
Roseveare et al [96] adopts a similar methodology again, with slightly modified as-
sumptions, different set of countries and reform scenarios. The paper neglects economic 
fluctuations, estimates the size of the labor force, then hypothesizes a productivity 
growth of 1.5% and constant activity rates. When considering an increase in the retire-
ment age, the activity rates of the cohorts involved are substituted with that of the popu-
lation average. They use 3, 5, 7% as real discount rate; 1 and 2% as productivity growth 
is also considered. The present values of the implicit debt, with a discount factor of 3%, 
are between 28 and 416% (of GDP). With a choice of 5%, the results reduce to -18 and 
235%. The numbers are not much sensitive to the choice of productivity growth. Lastly, 
this article also considers certain reforms, then runs several simulations for healthcare 
and fiscal policies in general. The results for reforms are as follows: an increase of the 
retirement age to 70 basically eliminates any debt. An increase of this size is out of 
question in Hungary, based on life expectancy measures. An expenditure cut starting 
from 2015 (meaning that social security expenditure growth is constrained by GDP 
growth) eases on the problems in most cases, but the numbers remain above 100% for 
many countries. Restricting eligibility also helps, but does not always solve the prob-
lems. Finally, a pure wage indexation of the pensions deteriorates the balances even 
further. 
                                                          
5 Like population growth, but not using actual age-gender cells of the population; actual contribution 
rates but skipping detailed service years criteria, etc. 
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Augusztinovics [95] is the most similar paper to ours: it also evaluates the Hungarian 
social security system, in a medium horizon (50 years – as we will see, this is not al-
ways a time period long enough). Though it analyses a situation prior to the final setup 
of the pension reform, we will see that its conclusion are similar to ours: the short-run 
disguises the shortcomings and imbalances of the system, but these deterioriations have 
their full bite in the long-run. 
 
V. Our model 
 
III.1.  The basics of the model 
 
The model was developed during the preparations of the Hungarian pension reform, by 
Rita Bán, and was rewritten later by Pat Wiese. For our simulations, the program was in 
general appropriate. We had to broaden the operations it carries out, and some parame-
ters, time series and cross-section data assumptions had to be modified. The nutshell 
version of the model is as follows.  
 
As a first step, we update the number and pension stock of existing retirees, in age-sex 
categories: for population size, we use age-sex(-disability) specific death rates, while 
the pension stock is indexed according to previous year's age-sex-type categories. 
 
Second, we determine the number, distribution and pension stock of new beneficiaries 
(excluding old age pensions). For disability accounts, the inflow is calculated according 
to age-sex specific entry rates. We assume a linear improvement in these rates, ending 
in 2030, at 50% of the current level (the reason for this is that current laws are way too 
soft for disability, mostly for camouflaging unemployment – but continuous tightening 
of the rules is underway). Benefits are tied to average wages. For survivor benefits of 
orphans, entry rates are obtained by assuming an average couple (age and age-
difference) and using their death rates. The forecasts based on 1994 are matched with 
actual 1995 numbers, and their ratio is kept as a correction factor to be applied in all 
future years. Benefits are indexed to average wages. For survivor benefits of widowers 
in working age, we use average marriage rates, average couples, and death rates to de-
termine the number of beneficiaries. The same correction method is used as in the case 
of orphans. Benefits are kept at a constant level relative to wages. Finally, for survivor 
benefits of widowers among retirees, the number of eligible persons are calculated us-
ing average marriage rates, age difference, measures of eligibility and death rates. We 
assume that half of them chooses this instead of her/his own benefit. The benefit itself is 
assumed to be equal to 55% of spouse's benefit (50% by law, but there is a selection 
bias in the actual numbers: people with high benefits will choose the survivor benefit 
relatively more. Data suggests this 55% as a working assumption). Current changes in 
law replaced this optional system by an automatic benefit of 20%   this is not yet in-
corporated into the model, but this should not really change the results. 
 
As a next step, we need to index age-sex specific wage profiles: first of all, we need the 
shape of these distributions. Due to lack of data, we assume that these shapes are con-
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stant, which we choose to be the picture from 1994. In each year we multiply this by an 
appropriate number, to match the prescribed real wage growth in the economy. If the 
currently simulated scenario contains an increase in the retirement age, then the wages 
of the cohorts involved are equalized to the wages of the cohorts just prior to retirement. 
Then, we update the labor force, contributors and their contributions. We summarize the 
inactive segments of the population by age, sex and category: students, mothers on ma-
ternity leave, soldiers, disability beneficiaries and the unemployed. The sum of them 
plus the active segment cannot exceed 100%: if, due to certain (imprecise) trends or 
assumptions, this should happen, then we decrease the activity rate accordingly. Contri-
butions by active persons are equal to their legal requirement. We assume that 60% of 
the inactive is a contributor, and their average contribution is 41.3% of the contribution 
of the active (based on actual data ). 
 
Next, we determine the number, composition and benefits of incoming old age benefici-
aries: If a certain cohort has no eligible members (based on service years criteria – we 
assume the distribution of service years to be identical to the 1994 profile through time), 
then no entrants are considered. We distinguish the criteria for regular and early retire-
ment. If a certain cohort gives new entrants, then we modify the distribution of service 
years (its mean must fall, since people with high value retiree relatively more).The base 
for early retirement consist of eligible non-active persons: eligibility is determined by 
service years, and their actual retiring behavior is estimated using 1994 data. We forbid 
this optional retirement decision for regular retirees: we assume that everyone retirees if 
eligible ( neglecting work above the retirement age). Benefits are calculated according 
to actual rules, using the distribution of service years again. 
 
Finally, we calculate annual balances, then start simulating the next year. 
 
III.2.  Extending the model to 2100 
 
We will see in section IV that the model in its original form is not precise enough to 
calculate present values. Its time range is only up to 2050, and in spite of heavy dis-
counting, the crudely estimated tails of the present value6 are sometimes as large as, or 
even larger than the precisely simulated part (up to 2050). Hence, it was necessary to 
extend the model up to 2100. This involved the following modifications.  
 
Any trends are assumed to fade away by 2050, after that, there are no other changes 
than in demography (i.e. a long-run equilibrium path is reached, and fluctuations are 
neglected). Death rate is kept at the 2050 level. Birth rates are modeled as approxi-
mately equal to the average between 2040 and 2050, i.e., in each year, there are 
0.211587 births per person in the age group 20-25, 0.056431 between 26 and 30, 
0.041285 between 31 and 35, and 0.02674 between 36 and 40. These numbers are ob-
tained from estimating the original model's birth figures in the period 2040-50 (the 
demographic forecast of the original model ended there, and we could not access its 
continuation). We must notice that these numbers are substantially different form those 
presented in Tusnády [95], thus we get significantly faster population decline than they 
                                                          
6 The part after 2050 is obtained by fitting a geometric series on the annual balances and calculating the 
discounted value of that series.  
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do. We cannot judge the validity of this or that model – but it would be worthwhile to 
run some simulations with this other demographic variant to check how much differ-
ence it makes. 
 
The population projection after 2050 shows a somewhat even more pessimistic picture 
than the first part (the population decline accelerates for a while after 2052), but not by 
much, so it is not likely to have a huge effect on our numbers, since deficits (or sur-
pluses) of those years enter the present value sum with a heavy discounting. 
 
III.3.  Major assumptions of the model 
 
All forecasts are based on 1995 numbers (the time when the model was originally de-
veloped ). Data that became available since then shows that those projections were a bit 
pessimistic with respect to economic growth, and too optimistic for inflation. In spite of 
all these, most of our figures and calculations are based on the original assumptions, 
thus showing the situation facing the policymakers involved in the preparation of the 
pension reforms. Of course, we will also make simulations with the updated data, partly 
to see how much difference these things make, partly to obtain more reliable results. 
 
The next couple of figures will display the major economic and demographic assump-
tions of the model. Figure 1 shows the size of population and its composition by age: 
Notice the worsening after 2050, which may turn out to be a far too pessimistic assump-
tion. It would be useful and interesting to run a more optimistic version, where birth 
rates would start improving, leading to a zero population growth in the long-run (it is 
even more optimistic than the demographic model of Tusnády [95] ).  
 
 
Figure 1. Population and its age composition 
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The next two figures show the growth rates of the population, retirees and the labor 
force. We can also see the effect of a pension age reform on the latter two variables. 
 
Figure 2.1. Demograpy I. 
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Figure 2.2.  Demography II. 
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Figures 3 and 4 display the gender-specific age-earnings profiles. Many concerns and 
questions can be raised. First of all, why should these cross-section profiles be station-
ary? This seems to be particularly doubtful in a transition economy, but one can observe 
important changes in the earnings profiles even in well-developed (and well-settled) 
countries. The distinction of different segments of the labor market is likely to be even 
more important – one could maybe use some rough data or guesses on this. Unfortu-
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nately, neither the current version of the model, nor (and it is the main constraint) the 
available data allows this. The data is not simply inaccessible – in many respect, it is not 
appropriately collected, not processed or even lost. As a consequence, we will stick to 
the stationarity assumption. A compromising (but also speculative) working method 
could be to distinguish some segments of the labor market, using Hungarian or OECD 
data, then weighting these profiles by the sizes of these segments. The sizes could fol-
low a trend from current Hungarian data towards OECD averages. Such a solution may 
be undertaken in the future, but, unfortunately, not within this paper. 
 
Another concern raises the issue of work after retirement age, and also, the anomaly of 
the picture that net wages are above gross wages and constant, for ages above 60. This 
latter is most likely to come from some data error or irregularity, and does not make a 
real difference for our results: we are not considering work after retirement age. The 
reliability of the data is still in question, however – unfortunately, it is quite hard to 
check its validity. On the other hand, for some fractions of the labor force, this extra 
work is important, and may interfere with pension contributions and benefits7. Some 
further anomalies can obscure the picture even more, thinking especially of the illegal, 
semi-legal sector (people working officially for the minimum wage, and obtaining com-
pensation of other forms – which is an emerging way of tax evasion in Hungary, or 
other methods). 
 
                                                          
7 The main problem is, however, that it is hard to interpret and to estimate the notion of net wages in a 
complex income tax system. This also questions the choice of net wages as the means of indexation for 
pensions. 
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Figure 3. Male earnings 
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Figure 4. Female earnings 
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Figure 5. displays the cross-section of the service years of retirees. Stationarity of the 
picture is again controversial, and nothing guarantees that no major changes would oc-
cur in the close or distant future. Data is in lack for this issue, just like in the previous 
case. A problem of similar magnitude is that huge masses became unemployed around 
the 90s and lost quite substantial service years. Again, hardly any data is available. 
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Figure 5. Distribution of service years 
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The next two figures show the initial assumptions and forecasts on the economic per-
formance: CPI, net and gross wages, GDP – are we too optimistic or too pessimistic 
about convergence and catch-up? The period between 95 and 98 has proven to be better 
in growth terms, but worse for inflation. Changes in both the short (more dynamic 
catch-up to the EU) and the long run (slower growing long-run economy) may have 
substantial effects on our results. Some reforms (e.g. the fully funded system) may have 
positive economic effects on productivity or aggregate savings. These effects are not 
incorporated into our simulation. The main reason is that it would be hard to quantify 
them in a demographic model. Our results still carry meaning for these issues as well. If 
our numbers measure the changes without these positive side effects (e.g. if the debt 
increases with the introduction of a fully funded second pillar), then the increase in sav-
ings, work effort etc. can balance that – but for this it needs to bring at least as much 
improvement as the worsening indicated by our results. 
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Figure 6.1 Economic forecasts I. 
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Figure 6.2. Economic forecasts II. 
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The reform variables and other trends considered are the following. For the second pil-
lar of the social security system (which is a fully funded system, with statutory mini-
mum contribution rates), the scenarios are: none, voluntary or compulsory (for men, up 
to year 40, for women, up to 35) switch from 1998. Indexation of pensions is based on 
either last year's real wages or on the Swiss system (half real wages, half inflation) from 
2009. In case of an increase of the retirement age, it becomes 62 for both men and 
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women. During its transition, the service year criteria are gradually changing as well. 
The contribution to the 1st pillar of pensions (a "traditional" PAYG system) is 66.66%, 
which is slightly higher now, but will be reduced to a similar value soon. We assume a 
linear decrease of the entry rate to disability insurance: halving the entry rate from 1998 
to 2010, then keeping it constant. Its rationale is that current legislation is very soft on 
eligibility (to camouflage unemployment) but the rules will become more restrictive 
gradually. Thus, this is a reasonable catch-up assumption to Austrian-German averages. 
For changes in the age-specific activity rates, we use a similar linear adjustment to cur-
rent German-Austrian standards, assuming catch-up by 2015. Unemployment rates are 
assumed to decrease linearly from 1995 to the natural rate by 2015, then stay constant. 
We also consider an 8% increase in the base of social security contributions from 1997. 
 
VI. Results  
 
First of all, we need to summarize the most important issues we want to address. The 
most basic question is that how large the implicit pension debt is (would be) if we were 
not to introduce the reforms (but only the consolidation of the contribution rates ). Then, 
how much is the decrease when the contribution base is broadened, retirement age is 
increased, and indexation and second pillar is introduced?  
 
What would be the effects of further reforms? For example, a cut or increase in contri-
bution rates; an improvement of the efficiency of revenue collection8; a change in the 
relative size of the first and the second pillar. What are the (relative) dynamics of the 
explicit and implicit part of the pension debt? How does it relate to a potential interest 
service of the total implicit debt? A further issue could be its interaction with the matur-
ity structure of public debt (does it exaggerate or mollify the spikes)? With the excep-
tion of this very last one, we will get some results for all the other questions. 
 
The forthcoming tables contain the results of our computer simulations, under various 
reforms, parameter and forecast constellations. Numbers describing parts or the whole 
of the implicit debt are expressed as percentage of the 1995 GDP. For absolute levels, 
this value is 3698 T HUF (approx. 17 T USD since 1 USD is around 210 HUF), and the 
explicit public debt was 3698 T HUF (66% average between 1990 and 95)9. There are 
some entries marked with an 'X' – they refer to an infinite (in all cases: positive) value 
of the discounted sum (or more precisely: its tail after 2100 grows faster than the dis-
count rate). Negative numbers indicate a net deficit, while positive numbers correspond 
to net surpluses. 
 
To guide us in orders of magnitude, it is useful to remember the following result. 
Should one cut the government budget by 1% of GDP each year from now on (from 
1995 on), that would reduce the present value of future expenses by 43-75% of current 
                                                          
8 Amounts that are taken into account when calculating pensions, but not collected because of bankruptcy 
etc., or student years without contributions, but still counted as service years. 
9 A question may be raised: should one compare the present value of implicit debt to the actual stock of 
the explicit debt, or rather, to the present value of its interest services? It can be checked easily that these 
two measures are identical. 
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GDP10. Hence, if the implicit debt is reduced by 100% of GDP, that is equivalent to a 
permanent budget cut of 1.5–2.5% per year. 
 
IV.1.  Basic Results 
 
The headlines of the tables contain the abbreviations of certain sub-steps of the reform 
introduced. They stand for the following: no reform – only the contribution rates are 
changed, base br. – an increase of 8% in the contribution base, starting from 1997, ret. 
age – an increase of the retirement age (62 for both female and male), index – introduc-
ing a fifty-fifty percent Swiss indexation from 2009, vol. 2.p. – introduction of the sec-
ond pillar with voluntary choice of joining it or not, comp. 2.p. – second pillar with 
compulsory choice (below 40 for men, below 35 for women).  
 
The first table shows the results of the original model: which had simulations up to 
2050. As the flow of contributions and pension payments does not stop in 2050, the rest 
of the present value can be estimated. In our case, a geometric series was fitted on the 
imbalances of the last decade, and the tail of that series have replaced the “true” infinite 
simulation run.  
 
 
Notice that the results are driven in many cases by the fitted geometric series tail – this 
makes it necessary to extend the model until 2100. The results with this modified ver-
sion are the following: 
 
                                                          
10 Depending on ways of discounting – if the discount factor 1 + i is obtained by i = 5% + CPI, then 43%, 
while if i = 5 % + 100 year forward average of inflation, then 75%. 
scenario no 
reform 
base br. base br. 
ret. age 
base br. 
ret. age 
index. 
base br.  
ret. age  
 
vol.2.p. 
base br.  
ret. age 
index, 
comp.2p 
base br. 
ret. age 
index, 
vol.2.p. 
PDV up to 2050 (%) -75.3 -67.0 -24.8 0.3 -51.4 -33.8 -28.4 
last PDV increment (%) -1.29 -1.34 -0.96 -0.38 -0.87 -0.25 -0.38 
fitted growth rate of 
annual balance 
1.055 1.062 1.068 1.073 1.05 1.034 1.038 
Discount rate 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 
estimated tail after 
2050 (as a geom. se-
ries, %) 
-66.8 -111.7 -149.0 -259.2 -37.0 -6.6 -10.9 
total (%) -142.1 -178.7 -173.8 -258.9 -88.4 -40.4 -39.3 
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It is clear that our previous results for the tails after 2050 were indeed quite imprecise. 
Moreover, the tails we obtained now are really small relative to the simulated part, 
which makes it likely that our results are good enough, both in an absolute and a rela-
tive way. The estimated tails are still not completely insignificant, which might call for 
further extensions. Also, this simulation is even more accurate than the original one 
(simulation until 2050 only), as all the variables of the model are obtaining their long-
run (forecasted) equilibrium values. However, extending the model further on would 
imply a large cost in computing time, and only a small gain in accuracy. So we will use 
the 2100 extension of the model from now on. 
 
The results are impressing already just in themselves. The pre-reform debt value is 
128% of GDP, which is roughly double the size of the explicit debt. The largest reduc-
tion is due to the increased retirement age and the Swiss indexation. Together with base 
broadening, the debt reduces to 16% of GDP. In fact, all this decrease is one in one 
taken away from the value of pensions: the only source of pensions is the pay-as-you-go 
system, so all liabilities of the government are also claims for citizens, and vice versa. 
 
So, from a purely financial point, it would have been enough to introduce these three 
measures only – but that would have implied a large cut in the value of pensions. Intro-
ducing the second pillar can get through this problem: here we can decrease the value of 
the pension debt and still keep the level of pensions relatively high, since the PAYG 
system ceases to be the only source of benefits.  
 
We can see that introducing the second pillar but not the Swiss indexation increases the 
debt value quite much: from 3614 T (65.48%) to 4507 T (81.66%). This is due to the 
financing need of the transitory period: benefits remain at the same level while contri-
butions are cut back. We see that this effect grows with the number of people joining 
the second pillar: the result is 2416 T (43.78%) with compulsory, 2170 T (39.57%) with 
voluntary switching (but with Swiss indexation introduced again, in both cases). 
 
Taking a closer look at these scenarios, we find that this difference is due to the rela-
tively early years of the time frame. The detailed expenditure-revenue numbers indicate 
the following. The present value of benefits from 2004 to 2019 minus the value of con-
scenario no 
reform 
base br. base br. 
ret. age 
base br. 
ret. age 
index. 
base br. 
ret. age  
 
vol.2.p. 
base br. 
ret. age 
index, 
comp.2p 
base br. 
ret. age 
index, 
vol.2.p. 
PDV up to 2100 (%) -114.7 -108.5 -55.1 -12.5 -74.4 -41.7 -37.5 
last PDV increment (%) -0.39 -0.41 -0.30 -0.12 -0.21 -0.07 -0.07 
fitted growth rate of 
annual balance 
1.046 1.046 1.045 1.041 1.045 1.040 1.040 
discount rate 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 1.075 
estimated tail after 
2100 (as a geom. se-
ries, %) 
-14.0 -14.7 -10.4 -3.6 -7.3 -2.1 -2.1 
total (%) -128.7 -123.2 -65.5 -16.2 -81.7 -43.8 -39.6 
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tributions from 1998 to 2013 is bigger for the compulsory scenario. This shows that for 
the main contributors of this period, i.e. the age group above 45, it is more beneficial to 
follow the compulsory switching (zero for them) than the Argentine (around 50%). The 
same applies for benefits between 2020-31 and contributions in 2014-25, which shows 
that the cohorts below 35 will also be closer to 100% than in Argentina (70-80%). Ac-
tual experience seems to support these conclusions – but we also state that this was pre-
dictable from these calculations, and would have been predictable even back in 1995. 
To put it in a different way, we can say that people in general were not at all averse to 
the new system (as many policy makers were suspecting), and, after evaluating the 
situation carefully, has made a fairly rational decision. 
 
Comparing these results to the preexisting number in the literature, we find that Hun-
gary was in the middle range before the reforms, and moved to the low-range after 
them. Which means that the pre-reform numbers were large but not outrageous, and 
became nicely low since then. Note that, however, most countries with higher implicit 
debt indicators still run a pay-as-you-go system, so any Hungarian post-reform number 
should not be used as a measure for comparing the effects of demography to social se-
curity systems. But as financial indicators, our results have full strength. 
 
IV. 2. Sensitivity analysis: How much do our results change when we modify some of 
the assumptions, parameter choices? 
 
It is interesting and particularly important to investigate how sensitive our results are to 
certain forecasts we have employed in our simulations, or to some other parameters 
(discount rate etc.). As this might lead to an explosion of computing time, it is necessary 
to restrict the set of modifications.  
 
The following comparisons seem to be the most important: pre-reform values (rel. to 
GDP), effects with all the reforms but the second pillar, effects with all the reforms but 
the Swiss indexation, and finally, the relative behavior of voluntary and compulsory 
switching. We will calculate the results for these scenarios (meaning that the two sce-
narios with base broadening only, and base broadening and age increase only, will be 
omitted),. with the following parameters changed: 2 and 1.5% productivity growth in-
stead of 3%; a long-run inflation of 2 and 3%, instead of 2.5%; finally, an improvement 
of 25% in the disability entry rate, instead of 50%. The choice of the discount factor 
will be analyzed in a separate section. 
 
Besides these macroeconomic features of the model, it would be interesting to introduce 
new data (or data substituting methods) for age-earnings profiles, and also for the distri-
bution of service years. An alternative demographic scenario, based on Tusnády [95] 
would also worth considering. Unfortunately, due to the huge amount of necessary data 
and other calculations, these issues remain for future work. 
 
Now let us see the results of the simulations. 
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With a 2% of growth rate, the pre-reform value is 98%, which reduces to 18% as a re-
sult of the first subset of reforms (no second pillar, but all the other). With second pillar 
but no indexation, it stays at 64%. Reintroducing the indexation reduces the debt burden 
to 45.86% and 41.15%. The difference between the two switching scenarios remains 
similar to the previous, and their dynamics also (which is no surprise, since the de-
creased growth assumption is in effect only from around 2010). In general, we can say 
that the slower growth did not change the post-reform results by much, but just the op-
posite with pre-reform values. The other observation is that the values of scenarios 
without indexation have decreased, while those with indexation have increased. This is 
due to the nature of indexation: Since slower growth reduces the wage bill one in one, 
the pension bill without indexation also one in one, while with indexation, the reduction 
is less than one in one, so the pension bill decreases less than the wage bill. 
 
The effects of an even smaller growth rate are almost the same as previously, but here 
the decrease of the pre-reform values is also relatively smaller. It is true in general that 
       %
Reform Part of 
PDV 
Para-
meters 
in basic 
setup 
2% 
growth 
1.5% 
growth 
2% 
inflation
3% 
inflation 
25% 
impr. 
in disab. 
rate 
 Until 
2100 
-114.67 -93.58 -86.39 -115.26 -114.01 -124.03 
Original After 
2100  
-14.02 -4.61 -2.77 -13.87 -14.16 -12.778 
 Total -128.68 -98.19 -89.16 -129.13 -128.17 -136.81 
Base broaden-
ing,  
Until 
2100 
-12.53 -15.93 -16.56 -13.85 -11.13 -25.13 
Age increase, After 
2100  
-3.64 -1.99 -1.43 -3.77 -3.49 -4.36 
Indexation Total -16.17 -17.92 -17.99 -17.63 -14.62 -29.68 
Base broaden-
ing,  
Until 
2100 
-74.4 -62.11 -57.81 -75.03 -73.67 -89.49 
Age increase, After 
2100  
-7.26 -2.45 -1.49 -7.26 -7.27 -8.11 
Vol. 2. Pillar Total -81.66 -64.56 -59.29 -82.34 -80.94 -97.6 
Base broadening,  Until 
2100 
-41.68 -44.55 -45.08 -42.62 -40.69 -53.09 
Indexation, After 
2100  
-2.1 -1.3 -0.96 -2.22 -1.98 -3.15 
Comp. 2. Pillar Total -43.78 -45.86 -46.04 -44.84 -42.67 -56.24 
Base broadening,  
age increase, 
Until 
2100 
-37.47 -39.85 -40.19 -38.42 -36.47 -48.98 
Indexation, After 
2100  
-2.1 -1.3 -0.96 -2.22 -1.98 -3.15 
Vol. 2. Pillar Total -39.57 -41.15 -41.15 -40.64 -38.45 -52.13 
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the debt became less sensitive to the growth rate as a result of the reforms, and also that 
a smaller growth rate tends to increase the implicit debt. One may say, however, that 
these effects are not significant, relative to the general errors of the simulation. 
 
The effect of a different long-run inflation is really small, and goes to the direction we 
expected: with higher inflation, due mostly to discounting, we gain some, and the oppo-
site with smaller inflation. The overall effect is, however, almost unnoticeable in the 
numbers. 
 
A less bright trend in disability entry rates has a far bigger, but still not surprising ef-
fect: the post-reform numbers are about 25% larger than previously. Thinking about the 
increased number of beneficiaries and the smaller number of contributors, the increase 
comes at no big surprise. 
 
Summarizing the results of the exercises, we see that our estimates of the implicit debt 
are not significantly sensitive to most of the parameters involved. This is quite promis-
ing for the reliability of the numbers – we will see, however, that the choice of the dis-
counting will matter far more. 
 
IV. 3. The choice of discounting 
 
As we will see quite soon, the choice of the discount factor will matter much for the size 
of the implicit debt. This is expected, on the one hand – but makes it hard to compare 
the explicit and implicit debt measures, on the other hand. At a later point, after seeing 
the results, we will argue again for the initial choice of 5%. 
 
A second issue is about nominal discounting: to which measure of inflation should we 
add the real discount factor? One approach is the one we used so far: adding it to the 
CPI of the current year. If the government finances the deficit with short-run, mostly 
one-year debt, then this choice seems to be valid. But this gives a major role for eco-
nomic fluctuations: with a higher inflation, the medium-future is already discounted 
away, and our measure of the implicit debt is mainly driven by current and close future 
events. 
 
As an alternative, one could consider the required return on long, say, 5, 20 or 100 
years-long treasury papers (we will choose the last one). For us, it means that we need 
to take the (geometric) average of the inflation forecast of 100 years starting from the 
current year.  
 
Here come the results: for CPI plus 7 and 3% of real discount rate, then using the values 
of the 100 years coupon (with 5% again). 
% 
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With 7%, present and close future gets relatively more weight than distant future, and 
present values decrease in general, since future becomes cheaper both in relative and 
absolute terms. As a consequence, pre-reform and no-2nd-pillar results reduce to 58% 
and 2.6% respectively. 2nd pillar without indexation gives 38%, while the full scenario 
with the two different switching variants take 25.6 and 22.2%. The difference reduces 
between these two, but the sign remains the same. 
 
With 3% as the real discount rate, both the direction and the magnitude of the changes 
is the opposite of those with 7%. This is not surprising, since as we approach the growth 
rate with the discount factor, the discounted sum (like a geometric series) starts to in-
crease in a nonlinear (and quite fast) way. The tail values of the results exceeding 200% 
should not be taken too seriously, since the fitted values are quite likely to be really 
imprecise, but even the subparts up to 2100 are gigantic. The total debt value is 620% 
without any reforms, which reduces to 120% with partial reforms (no second pillar). 
The result is 343% if we exclude indexation but include the second pillar. The debt val-
ues of the full reforms are 120 and 117%, respectively. This is the only scenario where 
these numbers are smaller than the no second pillar values. This is reasonable: the sec-
ond pillar involves bad present and close future, and promises a brighter distant future 
(transitory imbalances at the beginning, then the deteriorating demographic structure 
hits only a 66% level of PAYG pensions). So if we discount the future relatively less, 
then the evaluation of the second pillar improves. 
 
Using the 100 years coupon, the pre-reform numbers are significantly higher, as future 
(which is not so bright) gets a higher relative weight. The reform scenario involving 
everything but the second pillar gets a better grade – this must be due to the positive 
effects of the close future. The scenario of everything but indexation shows a poor pic-
Reform Part of PDV 5% 
discount 
rate 
7% 
discount 
rate 
3% 
discount 
rate 
100 
years 
coupon 
 Until 2100 -114. 7 -56.8 -298.6 -170.1 
Original After 2100  -14.02 -1.21 -321.4 -4.19 
 Total -128.7 -58.04 -620.0 -174,3 
Base broadening,  Until 2100 -12.53 -2.26 -57.2 12.61 
Age increase, After 2100  -3.64 -0.33 -63.52 -1.02 
Indexation Total -16.17 -2.59 -120.7 11.59 
Base broadening,  Until 2100 -74.4 -38.09 -185.2 -110,9 
Age increase, After 2100 -7.26 -0.64 -157.7 -2.18 
Vol. 2. Pillar Total -81.66 -38.72 -343.1 -113.9 
Base broadening, age increase,  Until 2100 -41.68 -25.47 -85.39 -46.65 
Indexation, After 2100  -2.1 -0.19 -35.03 -0.67 
Comp. 2. Pillar Total -43.78 -25.66 -120.4 -47.33 
Base broadening, age increase, Until 2100 -37.47 -22.05 -82.15 -37.81 
Indexation, After 2100  -2.1 -0.19 -35.03 -0.68 
Vol. 2. Pillar Total -39.57 -22.25 -117.2 -38.49 
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ture, but once indexation is reintroduced, the choice of the nominal part of discounting 
ceases to matter much.  
 
It will be interesting to compare the literature’s result of 213% not only with these num-
bers, but also with those obtained by using more current data. What we see right here is 
that pre-reform values are a lot higher with 3%, smaller with 5 and 7%, post-reform 
values are smaller even with 3%, and similar can be said about the 100 years coupon 
choice. 
 
To summarize our analysis of the discount rate, we can further emphasize the foreseen 
and completely reasonable fact that the implicit debt is very sensitive to this choice. 
Based on our numbers, and also on the literature, the choice of 5% seems to be the most 
reasonable (even as a future conventional choice). 
 
Comparing different scenarios may provide us with a crude way to estimate an aggre-
gate discount rate of the population (assuming complete intergenerational altruism). The 
idea is the following. Any pension payments other than the government support are just 
redistribution among people, so the population will maximize the size of this support by 
its switching decision. Of course, these supports are financed by taxes paid by the very 
same people – this is often forgotten by many, thus we will also do that in our ap-
proach… So if we are perturbing the switching numbers of any age-gender cell, the 
present value should not increase. Writing the present value as a function of these 
switching rates and the population discount factor, then r satisfies  
∇switching ratef(switching rate, r) = 0. 
Approximating the gradient numerically by simulations, we can obtain an estimate of r. 
Notice that we do not need our entire machinery for this numerical gradient: only the 
future contributions and benefits of each age-gender cell are required. An econometric 
analysis of this switching behavior could give us valuable information on how people 
are evaluating their future earnings. 
 
Regardless of what discount rate we would be getting, this value does not necessarily 
contradict our favorite choice of 5%. When we consider the implicit debt as a potential 
debt burden, the appropriate number is the real interest rate the government must offer 
on its bonds, which may differ from the discount rate of the consumers. The question 
then becomes that there can be many real interest rates, first of all, the riskless and the 
risky (stock performance) rate. The former is around 1% in the US, while the latter is 
6%, not very far from our 5% value. The choice of 1% would not make much sense, 
since growth rates are in general above this value, so the sums would become infinite. 
This supports the risky rate. The counter-argument is that the government will have to 
pay the riskless rate on its debt, and if the implicit debt were made explicit, the extra 
interest service would be based on this market’s prices. If, however, we want to con-
sider selling the system, then the buyer will use the risky rate as her opportunity cost, 
and also, if there were independent funds running the system, they would invest their 
current extra resources (which they need for future expenditures) on the stock market in 
general. This can be interpreted that the government obtains loans at 1% real interest 
rate, then transfers it to the social security funds, which invests it in the risky stock 
market. These funds have a long enough horizon and big enough amount to invest, so 
 25
the risky rate can be realized in the long-run average. And these funds, based on their 
declared long horizon, may be more appropriate to do this investment on the stock mar-
ket than the government. This way, one may find the negative debt of the government in 
the stock market, which the literature calculates to be optimal, but is missing empiri-
cally. 
 
IV. 4.  "Reality check"  
 
Inserting data from 95-98 (not yet available when the model was developed): real wage 
growth, inflation, the earlier introduction of Swiss indexation in 2001, actual distribu-
tion of people joining the second pillar (under the parameter choice of the main sce-
nario). We still do not have all the necessary numbers (data on people joining the sec-
ond pillar is only in very crude guesses), but no matter what, the results will be more or 
less similar to what we will soon see. There are quite substantial differences relative to 
the original numbers. This can mostly accounted to the faster economic growth and the 
slower deceleration of the inflation. We will also analyze a version when double digit 
inflation is present until 2010.  
% 
Reform Part of PDV Original 
data, 
 annual 
inflation 
Updated 
data,  
annual 
inflation 
Original 
data, 
100 yr. 
coupon 
Updated 
data,  
100 yr. 
coupon 
 Until 2100 -114.67 -103.64 -170.12 -187.03 
Original After 2100 -14.02 -14.56 -4.19 -5.27 
 Total -128.68 -118.2 -174.31 -192.30 
Base broaden-
ing, 
Until 2100 -12.53 19.53 12.61 29.14 
Age increase, After 2100 -3.64 -3 -1.02 -1.34 
Indexation Total -16.17 16.52 11.59 27.80 
Base broaden-
ing, 
Until 2100 -74.4 -61.97 -110.89 -115.70 
Age increase, After 2100 -7.26 -7.18 -2.18 -2.74 
Vol. 2. pillar Total -81.66 -69.15 -113.07 -118.43 
Base broaden-
ing, age in-
crease 
Until 2100 -41.68 -16.56 -46.65 -44.13 
Indexation, After 2100 -2.1 -1.55 -0.67 -0.85 
Comp. 2. pillar Total -43.78 -18.11 -47.33 -44.99 
Base broaden-
ing, age in-
crease, 
Until 2100 -37.47 -13.67 -37.81 -33.00 
Indexation, After 2100 -2.1 -1.55 -0.68 -0.86 
Vol. 2. pillar Total -39.57 -15.21 -38.49 -33.86 
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Comparing once more to the 213% result from the literature: numbers after the reforms 
are by far smaller, pre-reform results with a 5% discount rate are also. Pre-reform re-
sults with 4% as discount rate are 164%, which is not that far form 213%, but still sub-
stantially smaller than that. With the 100 years coupon, the numbers are quite close, 
though (even with 5%). 
 
When relating to the “as of 1995” results, we find that all numbers have decreased, and 
the values for scenarios containing the second pillar have particularly improved. 
Though most of it is due to higher inflation (and hence, heavier discounting), the effect 
of faster economic growth is not negligible either: pensions are growing slower than 
wage-based contributions. 
 
The situation for the 100 years coupon numbers is somewhat different: the no-
indexation scenarios fare worse, while the others improve again, but much less than 
previously. The results still give a very positive evaluation for the reforms, and we also 
see that the 100 years coupon numbers are less sensitive to economic fluctuations. 
 
IV.5.  Further reforms 
 
Here we will consider some potential deviations and further reform possibilities, rela-
tive to the fully implemented reform (including the earlier introduction of the Swiss 
indexation: 2001 instead of 2009 – hence the cells "pre-reform" may as well differ from 
our previous results). 
 
The first case is an increase in the contribution rates. As an example, we consider a 1% 
increase starting at 2010. As second, alternative demographic scenarios could be exam-
ined. The demographic model of Tusnády [95] uses similar death rates but quite differ-
ent birth rates. It would be good to introduce those numbers into the framework of our 
model and redo some of the calculations. The measure of the implicit debt is likely to 
decrease, but the size of this decline is hard to guess, though it would be quite impor-
tant. Moreover, one could assume a gradual improvement in the birth rates (up to levels 
high enough for a non-decreasing population). Both of these modifications should de-
crease the value of the implicit debt, but the magnitude is far from being clear. And it 
has quite an importance: it would give a lower bound on the benefits of such an im-
provement in birth rates, hence a government program can count on at least as many 
savings when considering such measures. As we have already mentioned, this analysis 
remains for future work. 
 
A next possibility is an improvement in the efficiency of contribution collection (this 
increases revenues but not benefits – hence differs from a pure base broadening). In the 
first example, we consider a 5% increase from 2010, in the second, it is only 1%. 
Changing the percentage of first-second pillar contributions (e.g. 50, 33%) is also an 
appealing reform to check, and, as we will see, it would really help a lot. Last, which is 
not even a reform literally, a slower deceleration of inflation – for example, 10% until 
2010, then a gradual decrease to 2.5% (identical to the previous inflationary dynamics). 
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% 
Scenario/parameters 
 
No 1. pillar 1. pillar Collec-
tion 
Collec-
tion 
Contrib. Higher
  Disc. Growth Infl. Reform 33.33% 50.00% 5.00% 1.00% Increase Inflation
  5.0 3.0 2.5 -27.6 7.8 -10.0 16.3 -26.0 -20.7 -20.2 
PDV 3.0 3.0 2.5 -68.3 43.7 -12.4 64.9 -64.2 -50.8 -54.3 
Until 7.0 3.0 2.5 -14.9 -1.1 -8.0 3.1 -14.1 -11.5 -10.0 
2100 5.0 2.0 2.5 -30.1 -3.2 -16.7 3.6 -28.7 -24.6 -23.4
  5.0 1.50 2.5 -30.5 -6.5 -18.5 -0.3 -29.2 -25.4 -24.0
  5.0 3.0 2.0 -28.9 6.3 -11.3 14.7 -27.3 -20.4 -18.9
  5.0 3.0 3.0 -26.3 9.3 -8.5 17.9 -24.7 -17.7 -22.1
(real) 5.0 3.0 2.5 -13.7 28.8 7.6 -3.8 -11.7 -5.5 -7.9 
 5.0 3.0 2.5 -2.1 5.7 X 6.7 -1.7 -1.3 -1.7 
PDV 3.0 3.0 2.5 -35.0 489.5 X 427.7 -11.8 -19.6 -12.2 
After 7.0 3.0 2.5 -0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 -0.2 -0.1 -0.3 
2100 5.0 2.0 2.5 -1.3 1.3 -0.1 1.6 -1.1 -0.9 -0,6 
 5.0 1.5 2.5 -1.0 0.6 -0.2 0.8 -0.8 -0.7 -0,5 
  5.0 3.0 2.0 -2.2 3.7 X 6.3 -1.6 -0.9 -0,5 
  5.0 3.0 3.0 -2.0 6.0 17.3 7.0 -1.8 -0.6 -1,1 
(real) 5.0 3.0 2.5 -1.5 7.4 4.7 -0.6 -1.3 -0.7 -1.6 
  5.0 3.0 2.5 -29.7 13.5 X 23.0 -27.7 -22.0 -21.9 
Total 3.0 3.0 2.5 -103.3 533.2 X 492.6 -75.9 -70.4 -66.5 
PDV 7.0 3.0 2.5 -15.0 -0.7 -7.8 3.6 -14.3 -11.6 -10.2 
 5.0 2.0 2.5 -31.4 -1.9 -16.8 5.2 -29.8 -25.5 -24.00
  5.0 1.5 2.5 -31.4 -6.0 -18.8 0.5 -30.1 -26.1 -24.5
  5.0 3.0 2.0 -31.1 10.0 X 21.0 -28.9 -21.3 -23.2
  5.0 3.0 3.0 -28.3 15.4 8.8 25.0 -26.5 -18.3 -19.4
(real) 5.0 3.0 2.5 -15.2 36.2 12.3 -4.4 -13.1 -6.3 -9.5 
 
The results are quite telling: the increase of the contribution rate is not enough to bal-
ance the budget, in many cases, it does not even bring substantial improvements; higher 
inflation helps, due to the incomplete valorization. The 5% efficiency gain in contribu-
tion collection roughly balances the system, but the more realistic 1% gain does not 
bring that much. Finally, the most interesting results: the decrease in the relative impor-
tance of the first (PAYG) pillar of the system is really beneficial. This must be attrib-
uted to the long-run improvement and the working force peak in the medium future, 
which more than offsets the short-run loss. 
 
It would be worthwhile to check how the reforms change the dynamics of annual bal-
ances and the speed with which the implicit debt becomes explicit. However, the num-
bers themselves are not precise enough to enable any kind of short-run planning or fore-
cast; and the scenarios are not different enough to get any valuable comparisons. So, 
instead of giving the actual results themselves, we are just describing them verbally.  
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Initially, the deficits are initially lower than the virtual interest payments, so the short-
run situation is far more comfortable than the full picture. The early deficits turn into a 
heavy surplus  mostly due to the increased retirement age , but later on (after 2020 
or slightly earlier), they deteriorate quite significantly, leading to the negative total 
value.  
 
The comparison of the explicit and implicit parts would show this trend even stronger: 
by 2020, the implicit debt decreases only very slightly, so most of it remains for the 
years after 2020... Of course, new measures, reforms will be implemented by then to 
balance the system – but this is still not enough to validate any optimism about the pre-
sent situation. On the other hand, it is quite obvious that our model is not fine enough to 
give precise short-run estimates of balances. Factors that are of secondary effects for the 
implicit debt value, can move annual balances in any direction. But it is clear, even 
from our numbers, that the reforms have done quite much to ease on the budgetary pres-
sure, but we have still not fully escaped from it. 
 
VII. Conclusions and further research topics 
 
Our paper studied the implicit debt burden of the Hungarian social security system, and 
its changes after certain real and hypothetical reform measures. The most important 
results are that the Hungarian implicit debt burden prior to the 1998 reform was quite 
substantial but was not extraordinarily high in an international comparison. As the result 
of the implemented reforms, it has gone down from 100% of 1995 GDP to roughly 40% 
of it. This is equivalent to a permanent budget cut of approximately 1.5% of GDP per 
year. If we smooth the cyclicality of the late 90s less, then these measures are even bet-
ter. 
 
Considering further reform scenarios, the only promising direction (let alone the unreal-
istic 5% improvement in revenue collection) was the decrease of the size of the first 
(PAYG) pillar of pensions. Cutting contribution rates (which is a current policy pro-
posal) seems absolutely infeasible from a long-run perspective (though we have ne-
glected both the incentive effects of this cut and the savings and work effort effect of 
the fully funded system). 
 
Note that even if the present value is around zero, it still does not mean that there are no 
financial difficulties in the system. This total balance may disguise high temporary defi-
cits and surpluses, so it becomes necessary to borrow for the deficit period and pay it 
back later, or the opposite, invest the surplus to save for future deficits. Both of these 
may be problematic. 
 
Would a government sell the social security system (or, at least, make it independent)? 
Here we face the familiar short vs. long-run picture: if the system gives low deficits 
today but far bigger ones in the future, than the current government has no incentive to 
privatize the system11. Reversing the stream of thought, destroying preexisting inde-
                                                          
11 Moreover, if imbalances are growing just slightly slower than the discount factor, it is possible that this 
situation holds at any point in time. 
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pendent social security funds can be interpreted as not selling them ("buying them 
back"), which is reminiscent of the current Hungarian situation.  
 
From the viewpoint of methodology, the most important message was the problem of 
discounting. We saw that the results are extremely sensitive to the choice of the real 
discount factor, and we cannot come up with "scientific" arguments for any choice, 
other than citing the riskless and the risky rates of return. The government may use the 
margin between the two for improving its financial position (or diversifying risk), by 
obtaining low interest loans and investing those sums in the stock market via social se-
curity funds. But it is not only the real part of the discounting that is unclear: should one 
use annual measures of inflation, or a 5-20-100-years moving average of it? 
 
There are many open research agendas left around this question, for some of which we 
hope to get results in the future. One important direction points towards more detailed 
and reliable data assumptions: data on the labor force like longitudinal data on wages, 
activity rates, service years. Incorporating the positive economic effects (increased sav-
ings etc.) of certain reforms would be also instructive (in an OLG-type framework, for 
example). One could develop or use different models or obtain data for retirement be-
havior and combine that with the previous assumptions to refine the results. As an inde-
pendent project, both a theoretical and an econometric analysis of the switching behav-
ior would give us important insights. 
 
It would be extremely interesting to run similar simulations for other big parts of the 
implicit debt: healthcare, deposit insurance, certain subventions etc. As for a bit more 
general topic, one could analyze whether the effects of the implicit and explicit debt are 
different to the economy as a whole. If yes, then can their mix be considered as a policy 
choice variable? As a last proposal, can we observe discrete jumps in a country's risk 
evaluation after implementing a reform decreasing the implicit debt with such a magni-
tude? Should there be such an effect? Hopefully, future research will shed more light on 
these issues. 
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